From the limited information that leaks into the public sphere—slipping through the cracks of closed doors—we can only piece together how many public administrations actually operate. Everything appears to be “in order” until the first irregularity surfaces, either because competing interests collide or because institutions and ethical individuals—who still exist, fortunately—carry out their responsibilities with honesty and integrity, both within Greece and abroad. Two scandalous cases were exposed by institutions outside the country, each unfolding in waves of revelations: the Novartis affair, concerning the unlawful promotion of the company’s medicines, and the OPEKEPE affair, concerning the unlawful distribution of agricultural subsidies. The first was uncovered by the U.S. financial authorities, whose economic interests were harmed by Novartis’s practices. Their investigation eventually led them to Greece, where the company admitted to its illegal actions and settled by paying a substantial fine to close the case. The second case was brought to light by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in the name of protecting EU funds from unlawful distributions to ineligible recipients.

The Novartis case seems to be closing, with everyone—both perpetrators and supposed victims—escaping accountability. The statute of limitations has effectively become a “laundering machine” for illegal activity. Lengthy criminal proceedings, with the many possibilities for postponements, combined with short deadlines of the offenses that have been established by law, form the perfect recipe for policies that result in the absolution of all wrongdoers. (Apparently, the political cost of prosecuting hundreds of cases of manipulated prescriptions was deemed too high.)

The OPEKEPE case, involving agricultural subsidies and serious irregularities in their distribution, is still ongoing and already offers further confirmation of our initial concerns. The in-depth scrutiny of carefully concealed documents seems likely to produce new revelations. Since some of the emerging evidence implicates the political system itself—currently at a sensitive point in its cycle—there is uncertainty about the final outcome and about whether responsibility will truly be assigned to all offenders. Meanwhile, the heavy fine imposed on Greece by the EU continues to accrue, and its repayment will burden the national budget. (This is not the first time: for decades we have been “quietly” paying EU fines for illegal landfills.)

More recently, news emerged from another troubled area: public works. Disciplinary measures were imposed on certain officials who had approved unlawful demands from a contractor and recommended their payment. What makes this case noteworthy is that the referral to the disciplinary council was made by their own political superior at the time—an exceptionally rare move! Normally, paperwork is signed, collective bodies approve, and at most a few minority members raise complaints in the press. These, however, rarely go further and do not proceed to the substance, since the legislative framework does not encourage substantial (strict) controls, such as comparing actual work on the ground with what is recorded in official certifications. Even a brief look at the “Diavgeia” (Διαύγεια) transparency platform, where by law ALL administrative decisions must be published, reveals a consistent pattern: endless recapitulatory tables, frequent price revisions, and, ultimately, significant deviations from original contract amounts in a multitude of projects. If this is true across the country, it applies even more so in Mani, where public works funding is already minimal due to the small number of voters. Only rigorous, on-site audits—matched against the reported figures of completed projects—can maximize the impact of these limited funds.

In the end, only after all forms of controls have been completed, can broad conclusions be drawn about systems of illegality. The ethics and integrity of those in power—whether in local or state government—are revealed in how they respond to such audits. They are judged by their decisions: do they take radical measures to eliminate the root causes of corruption, or do they merely cover things up with delaying tactics and fragmentary measures?

                                                                                                THE EDITORIAL BOARD